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Introduction: Terrorism and the tourism 
industry 
The tourism „industry‟ or „sector‟ continues to be a 
highly attractive target for terrorists (Alexander, 2004: 
151; Mansfeld, 1999: 30; Pizam & Mansfeld, 1996; 
Sönmez & Graefe, 1998; Sönmez et al., 1999). Since 
9/11 tourism destinations, hotels and modes of 
transportation have regularly been the focus of terrorist 
attacks. Where tourists can generally avoid at-risk 
destinations by considering political strife in the 
region, crime statistics and trends, terrorist attacks can 
often be „inescapable‟ (Sönmez et al., 1999: 13). 
Whilst terrorism is never random violence (see Howie, 
2009a: 49), it is naturally difficult to avoid attacks 
when they may occur in New York City, on the Madrid 
commuter rail system or in the heart of London. The 
island resort of Bali has been targeted twice in major 
attacks, in 2002 and 2005, to devastating effect 
(Henderson, 2003, 2004; Hitchcock & Putra, 2007). 
The victims were affluent tourists, many of European, 
Australian or North American nationality. While most 
people with a television were able to follow the round-
the-clock media coverage of the London „7/7‟ attacks 
in 2005, few paid much attention to the more deadly 
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Organisations operating in the tourism industry are high priority targets for terrorists. In 
the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks tourism destinations, hotels and modes of public 
transportation have regularly been targeted by terrorists seeking to convey their violent 
message. As such, leaders and managers in the tourism industry carefully plan their 
security and counter-terrorism responses, often involving the hiring of security guards. 
It is here that I believe a significant gap in counter-terrorism preparedness exists. I argue 
that protecting tourism destinations is only possible if consideration is given to the 
effectiveness of security guards and understanding that their well-being will impact 
upon their ability to deliver security. I want to draw attention to the often ignored social 
role of security guards. On 9/11, 42 security guards died whilst helping save the lives of 
thousands. They performed their jobs admirably, despite being low-paid, under-
appreciated workers. In this paper I explore the social role of security guards in the 
context of tourism security. By drawing on representations of security guards in popular 
culture and reports on the state of the security guard industry, I argue that the lack of 
attention on the quality and well-being of guards is a significant black-spot in tourism 
security and terrorism preparedness.  
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attacks two weeks later in the coastal town of Sharm al
-Sheikh in Egypt where suicide bombers, targeting 
tourists, killed 88 people (BBC News, 2005). In June 
2014, terrorist organization al-Shebab stormed through 
a coastal town in Kenya targeting a police station, 
houses and hotels searching for „non-Muslims‟ (AFP, 
2014: 27). In a statement following the attack, al-
Shebab explained that the attacks will continue in 
response to the Kenyan government‟s oppression of 
Muslims and „warned tourists and foreigners to stay 
out of the country‟. This attack occurred only eight 
months after the Westgate shopping complex attack in 
Nairobi (see paper in this volume by Schroeder et al.). 
These examples of terrorists targeting tourism are only 
the tip of the iceberg. Terrorists have also viewed 
hotels (Stafford et al., 2002), public transport (Jenkins, 
2001), sporting events (Toohey et al., 2003), city 
centers (Coaffee, 2003; Howie, 2009a), and cultural 
and religious attractions (Bhattarai et al., 2005) as 
highly desirable targets. 
The terrorist threat to tourism is not something unique 
to the post-9/11 world. Pizam and Smith‟s (2000: 132) 
research provides insight into the pre-9/11 effects of 
terrorism in tourism locations and on the tourism 
  
industry between 1985 and 1998. They found that more 
than half of the terrorist attacks on tourism destinations 
occurred in the Middle East (54%), with Europe the 
second most prevalent (27%). Of the attacks targeting 
tourism locations, 71% of the victims were tourists (as 
opposed to local workers and residents). The average 
number of deaths per attack was 37, making terrorists 
targeting tourism a particularly bloody form of 
terrorism. Almost half of the attacks in tourism 
locations were carried out in urban environments, with 
a third occurring on modes of transport. In 45% of the 
attacks, guns were used. In the aftermath of these 
attacks, demand for tourism decreased for periods of 
time averaging between one and six months.  
For managers, leaders and employees of organizations 
operating in the tourism industries, and for the local, 
state and federal officials for whom tourism safety is a 
priority, the threat of terrorism requires a security 
response. In many situations and contexts, this will 
involve a complex array of security systems and 
practices including security technologies such as metal 
and bomb detectors; close liaising with state 
intelligence and policing authorities; close screening of 
clients, customers and visitors; computer systems for 
tracking and monitoring staff and visitors; and, most 
importantly, a highly trained and dedicated team of 
security guards without whom all the security 
technology in the world is close to useless. It is here 
that I believe a significant gap in counter-terrorism 
preparedness persists. I argue that protecting tourism 
destinations is only possible if consideration is given to 
the effectiveness of security guards and understanding 
that their well-being will impact upon their ability to 
deliver security. 
This paper has three sections. The first section 
contextualises the paper, presenting current literature 
on terrorism, tourism and security thinking. In section 
two, I outline the key literature that informs my 
understanding of the important role of security guards 
in counter-terrorism security. Here I explore the 
paradox that sees some of our most vulnerable 
locations being protected by undervalued, overworked 
and under-appreciated security staff. The existence of 
this paradox, I argue, is a significant blind-spot in a 
state‟s counter-terrorism efforts. In the third section, I 
examine the social role of security guards in the public 
imagination. Here I rely on representations of security 
guards in popular culture and security guard stories 
from the post-9/11 world. I conclude by arguing that 
counter-terrorism solutions in tourism locations require 
security staff be considered valuable and central to 
community safety. 
Terrorism, Tourism and Security Thinking 
Religious and pilgrimage tourism has become 
increasingly insecure and uncertain in the post-9/11 
world. This has been the case for two related reasons;  
1) Travel to risky or potentially uncertain areas, as sites 
of religion and pilgrimage may often be, is 
increasingly securitised in the post-9/11 world, and  
2) Sites of religion and pilgrimage, representing sites 
that attract mass gathering of people, are often 
considered highly attractive for would-be terrorists.  
In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, people altered their 
travelling habits. Indeed, as many Americans 
abandoned air travel they took to their cars, which 
resulted in sharp spikes in interstate road deaths across 
the US (Mueller, 2006: 3). The air transport industry 
was acutely affected, and tourism and related industries 
paid a heavy price for the fear that swept through many 
parts of the world (Alexander & Alexander, 2002; 
Alexander, 2004). 
Mueller (2006: 146) argues that terrorists will likely 
continue to innovate in their efforts in spreading fear 
and doubt. Their goal in selecting potential targets may 
become „if a bomb goes off in one of those [places], it 
can go off anywhere‟. Uncertainty, it seems, is their 
weapon of choice. Mueller notes that whilst acts of 
terrorism in the US have been mostly concentrated in 
large cities, a number of locations not in major cities 
have been targeted overseas, often in tourist areas. 
Indeed, hotels, holiday destinations, sporting events 
and the methods of transport to these locations have 
been frequently targeted by groups seeking to send a 
violent message to an audience.  
The case of tourism in Nepal, where adventure and 
pilgrimage tourism is a blended tourist experience that 
shares similar security problems is outlined by 
Bhattarai et al., in their 2005 work. As they argue, 
tourism in Nepal was increasing rapidly up until 
September 2001. In a nation where internal political 
struggles and an under-developed state apparatus 
meant that only the most adventurous tourists visited, 
„the global social climate spawned by September 11‟ 
has had a devastating effect on its third world tourism: 
Nepal exemplifies this situation, a country 
where global terrorism, couple with the 
ongoing domestic Maoist war, has wrecked its 
image as a Shangri-La . . . The World Trade 
Center disaster of 2001 not only increased the 
scale and scope of international terrorist 
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activity, but it ushered in the current US 
administration‟s global “war on terrorism,” 
significantly heightening concerns about 
security almost everywhere (Bhattarai et al., 
2005: 670). 
Nepal, and many places like it in the developing world, 
was deeply affected by 9/11 through a heavy reduction 
in tourism for a number of years following the attacks. 
Yet, despite the age of terrorism, as security was 
improved on passenger aircraft and most other forms of 
mass transport, and technological innovation made 
long distance travel quicker and more affordable, there 
has been quick recovery in the travelling industries as 
more people travel by plane than ever before, with the 
numbers expected to increase over the next 20 years 
(Jansen, 2014). 
Reflecting on how the tourism industry has long 
suffered at the hands of the terrorist threat, Pizam and 
Smith (2000: 123) argue that since before the end of 
the Cold War, a time which will be remembered by 
terrorism studies scholars as the years when terrorist 
organizations become aware of the transformative 
potential of spectacular violence, terrorism has been a 
part of the „travel and tourism landscape‟. Crisis and 
risk managers began playing important roles in 
organizations responsible for managing locations that 
are regularly visited by travelers each year. Throughout 
the 1980s and 1990s, terrorist attacks were having a 
significant impact on the tourism industry, leading to 
„steep declines‟ in demand for travel and 
accommodation (Pizam & Smith, 2000: 124). A steep 
increase in fear of terrorism targeting the tourism 
industry led to reductions in foreign travel initially, 
especially from the US to Europe, but was soon 
followed by a slowing of terrorist acts and an 
increasing demand for tourism services and products. 
This, in turn, was followed by 9/11 – the worst non-
state act of terrorism in contemporary history which 
was, for a time, devastating for the tourism and travel 
sectors (Alexander & Alexander, 2002; Alexander, 
2004). Airlines and air travel related industries were 
acutely affected (Alexander, 2004: 155-156). 
Korstanje and Clayton (2012: 10) argue that there is an 
inherent tension that reveals the effectiveness of 
terrorism as a weapon against tourism and tourism-
related targets. Tourism, the authors note, „involves 
freedom of movement and travel, and is a fairly 
effective way of disseminating cultural ideas and 
practices‟. It is, however, precisely this freedom of 
movement that places tourists in vulnerable positions. 
When 88 Australians (out of a total of 202 victims) 
were killed in the first Bali bombings in 2002, among 
the stated grievances was the decadence of Western 
tourists and their drunken behavior in the nightclub 
districts where the bombs were detonated. It may be 
that tourists are uniquely vulnerable to terrorism. And 
when one considers the religious volatility that has 
characterized so many parts of the world from North 
Africa, the Middle East, to Northern and Southern 
America and across Asia, tourism to religious sites and 
site of pilgrimage are likely to carry a heightened 
vulnerability as an unsecurable soft target that, if 
attacked, sends a powerful and violent propaganda 
message to witnesses throughout the world assuming 
cameras capture the violence. Again, the ordinary habit 
of photography conspires to render tourists ideal 
targets of those who would use violence to achieve 
their goals.  
Mansfeld (1999: 32) argues that while the impact of 
terrorism on tourism industries and destinations is 
„unpredictable and highly differential‟, there are 
several steps that tourism managers can undertake in 
order to prepare for terrorism and the threat of 
terrorism affecting their organizations. Mansfeld 
(1999: 35-36) recommends that counter-terrorism in 
tourism should be viewed as a „long-term process‟ 
involving the monitoring of trends in both tourism 
demand and terrorism events; cooperation and 
integration of all operations across related industries 
and sectors including law enforcement, government 
and intelligence organizations; representation from all 
key stakeholders at the strategic level; information 
sharing, especially on security and risk; and security 
budgeting. A significant difficulty here is the loss of 
will that often comes into play when people begin to 
forget the impact and fear associated with major acts of 
terror. As one senior manager in a public transport 
organization described it, his company secures his 
business to the extent that he can justify his and his 
company‟s actions in the event of a post-attack legal 
inquiry or royal commission (Howie, 2009a: 161). 
Indeed, perception is key for understanding the damage 
that terrorism causes and the impact on the tourism 
industry. It is well understood in terrorism studies 
scholarship that fear of terrorism has an impact far 
beyond any actual damage that terrorism causes 
(Friedland & Merari, 1985; Howie, 2012; Skoll, 2010). 
This led Richard Clutterbuck (1977: 13) to argue in his 
seminal Guerrillas and Terrorists that „the strongest 
single factor which leads governments to give way to 
terrorists, internationally or internally, is 
television‟ (and see Howie, 2012: 33). Pizam and 
Smith (2000: 125) believe that this same logic is at 
play in the tourism industries: 
  
~ 40 ~ 
International Journal of Religious Tourism and Pilgrimage  Volume 2(i), 2014 
  
  
Fear and insecurity about the possibilities of 
terrorism affect tourism demand, even when, in 
fact, deaths and injuries from terrorism for US 
citizens are statistically insignificant – less 
likely to occur than being struck by lightning or 
killed in an accident on the roads or at home. 
At the same time, however, terrorism has 
gained premier power and efficiency as a 
political weapon through mass media coverage 
and the exaggerated perceptions about traveler 
safety and security that this perpetuates. 
Understanding the role of the media is central to 
understanding the nature and threat of terrorism. As 
Mueller (2006: 2), argues terrorists kill on average „a 
few hundred people a year‟. Around the same number 
drown in US bathtubs each year. One astronomer puts 
the „lifetime‟ risk of dying at the hands of terrorists 
globally as „1 in 80,000‟. This is about the same 
likelihood of dying in an asteroid or comet strike on 
Earth (Harris in Mueller, 2006: 2). In the context of 
tourism, Mawby (2000: 109) describes this as the „risk-
fear paradox‟ where tourists fear becoming victims of 
crime or terrorism far beyond the calculated probability 
that such victimization will occur. The media, 
however, renders these probabilities meaningless. 
There is even evidence that suggests this fear can reach 
clinical levels of anxiety. In the weeks following 9/11, 
Xanax prescriptions increased 9% across the US, and 
22% in New York City (Stossel, 2014: 8-9). This trend 
was repeated as the Global Financial Crisis neared. As 
stock markets „went into free fall‟ prescriptions for anti
-anxiety and anti-depression medication and sleeping 
pills increased sharply. As I have described throughout 
my career, the media brings distant acts of international 
terrorism into our living rooms and provides fertile 
ground for deep seated anxieties to emerge within us, 
leading to perceptions that we are, somehow, 
personally threatened by terrorists. Or, as I have 
argued, the media makes us all witnesses to terror 
(Howie, 2009b; 2012; 2013). When it comes to 
terrorism and security, perception matters. As 
Korstanje (2009: 69-70) argues, it was not until the 
9/11 attacks that risk perception theories became 
popular in tourism and security research. Risk and 
security is about fear and emotions. 
Sites that receive visitors remain highly desirable 
targets for would-be terrorists. Sites that many people 
visit create bottle-necks and mass gatherings which, 
from a terrorist‟s perspective, are an ideal “soft” target. 
In Australia, „mass gatherings‟ are an important focus 
of Australia‟s counterterrorism preparedness (National 
Counter-Terrorism Committee, 2011). In this way, and 
from a counter-terrorism security perspective, we can 
potentially expand our understanding of pilgrimage 
security to include any site to which people are 
attracted at various or cyclical times of the year with 
the purpose of culturally experiencing or engaging 
locations that have a particular social, cultural or 
religious significance. Such locations of cultural 
pilgrimage include religious monuments and sites; 
sporting events; musical events and performances; 
adventure seeking locations like mountains, resorts, 
oceans, beaches and rivers; and a host of other tourism 
locations like major cities. All face similar security 
dilemmas that require careful, counter-terrorism based, 
security planning. As depicted in the security guard-
themed comedy film, Paul Blart: Mall Cop (2009), 
security guards „detect, deter, observe and report‟. 
Detect, deter, observe, report – it is a powerful 
metaphor for officers who play a significant role in 
public safety whilst having no greater power than an 
ordinary citizens‟ arresting rights. Unlike police 
officers, security guards can be prosecuted for 
unlawful detention (Carlson, 1995: 67-68; Parfomak, 
2004:4). They can detect problems, deter the offenders 
if they can, watch and tell someone. However, as I will 
show throughout this paper, in times of terror security 
guards do far more than this. Indeed, on 9/11 security 
guards were heroes and worked and died alongside 
emergency services personnel. They did so with far 
less acclaim, and for far less pay. 
The Counter-terrorism Role of Security 
Guards 
The role of security guards in a nation‟s counter-
terrorism preparedness or a business‟ counter-terrorism 
security is an issue that has not been widely studied or 
well understood (but see Shearing & Stenning, 1983; 
van Steden & Nalla, 2010). It became a matter of 
public discussion when, in 2005, New York‟s city 
council announced a proclamation that „Private 
security officers displayed great courage and 
professionalism as they risked their lives to maintain 
order, evacuate thousands and help save lives‟ (United 
Voice, 2011: 8). Once the dust had settled, 42 security 
guards had lost their lives in the attacks on the Twin 
Towers. Since security guards are such a ubiquitous 
part of our safety-conscious culture I have been unable 
to locate a reliable estimation of how many security 
guards were on duty that day. What we do know is, 
remarkably, more security guards were killed in the 
attacks on the Twin Towers than NYPD police 
officers, and they worked for far less pay, fewer 
benefits and support, and with less social acclaim and 
privilege in the community.  
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The social significance of security guards has received 
little attention in the sociology, terrorism studies, and 
counter-terrorism studies literatures (but see Howie, 
2012: 133-154; Alexander & Alexander, 2002: 55). 
Studies of the role of security guards is almost 
exclusively housed within criminological fields where 
guards are viewed as law and order appendages (Sarre 
& Prenzler, 1998, 2000, 2011), „private‟ or „plural‟ 
policing (Loader, 2000; Jones & Newburn, 2006), or as 
a criminalistic population themselves. The numerous 
criminological contributions obfuscate what is the most 
dangerous black spot in domestic counter-terrorism 
functionality. To understand the role that security 
guards play in counter-terrorism it is not enough to 
consider their roles, practices, skills and behaviours as 
keepers of social control and as private police. We also 
need to consider their working conditions and 
remunerations; the expectations that people have of 
guards; their perceived social roles; their perceived 
social value and importance/relevance; their symbolic 
value; and their challenges, lives, well-being and health 
(St. John, 1991; United Voice, 2011).  
I argue that security guards have a significant place in 
counter-terrorism security. It could be argued that 
security guards are the first line of defense against 
suicide bombers. We might also say that security 
guards are the first first responders – already standing 
guard at entrances to buildings, sporting events or in 
the lobby of hotels when terrorists attempt their 
attacks. Security guards are a visible and, I argue, 
symbolic feature of counter-terrorism safeguards for 
any organization as they work alongside police and 
intelligence officers. As a US congressional report 
showed, security guards „fill the gap‟ created by 
limited public resources and insufficient numbers of 
police (Parfomak, 2004: 5). Security guards, you see, 
are a much cheaper way of providing security, safety 
and the appearance of certainty (Howie, 2009a). 
However, there is a dark underside for those who work 
as security guards, often for demanding hours, little job 
security and minimal reward. As one security guard at 
an Australian defense base explains,  
We‟re the first ones a terrorist or a maniac is 
going to see. If they‟ve got a knife or a gun, 
we‟re the people who will cop it (United Voice, 
2011: 33). 
Indeed, security guards are often the victims of terrorist 
attacks. In fact, there are numerous examples of 
security guards becoming victims of an attack due to 
their successful execution of their role. It could be 
argued that security guards face a terrible paradox – to 
successfully prevent an attack and be among the dead, 
or, do little to stop an attack, and survive it to the 
detriment of those the guards are assigned to protect. 
These problems are not mere abstractions. In July 
2011, Pakistan‟s The Daily Post reported that between 
2006 and 2011, terrorist attacks in Islamabad claimed 
the lives of 40 security guards and seriously wounded 
18 (Hassan, 2011). The murdered security guards 
worked at the Marriott Hotel (in one such attack 17 
guards were killed); a car park at Islamabad 
International Airport (the guard was the only victim); 
and restaurants and cafes (Howie, 2012: 143).  
There is an incredible paradox at the heart of the 
security guard industry, especially when they stand 
guard at sites that are highly desirable targets to would-
be terrorists. We routinely ask these low-paid and 
undervalued workers to be on the frontline of some of 
our most important security operations. In some 
circumstances, we ask some of society‟s lower paid 
workers to save some of society‟s highest paid workers 
(as was the case on 9/11, see DiMarco, 2007; Howie, 
2012: 133-154; Parfomak, 2004). Parfomak‟s (2004) 
US congressional report discussed some alarming 
realities: 
In the US in 2003, around one million security 
guards were employed and were being paid an 
average full-time, annual salary of $19,400. 
This salary places security guards well below 
the average annual salary across all 
occupations in the US. 
There were only 650,000 police officers during 
this same year being paid on average more 
than double that of security guards.  
Organizations and agencies responsible for 
counter-terrorism paid little attention to the 
security guard management practices in private 
companies, even when those private companies 
were responsible for the security of important 
public locations. 
It was „an open question‟ as to whether 
companies that employ security guards at 
vulnerable locations „have hired, trained, and 
otherwise supported security guards to the 
degree warranted by the social value‟ of the 
places they are stationed to protect (Parfomak, 
2004: 1. My emphasis). 
Intelligence indicated that it was likely that 
terrorist organizations pay close attention to 
the practices and behaviors of security guards 
at locations they are considering as targets. 
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What right do we have to expect underpaid and 
undervalued workers to protect us when terrorists 
strike? Surely, security guards would have little reason 
to risk their lives in defending strangers from becoming 
victims of terrorism. Yet, evidence from the 9/11 
attacks suggest that security guards will be nothing 
short of heroic when required. Gabriel Torres, a 
security guard in building 5 of the World Trade Center, 
risked his life to save others and saw many of his 
colleagues do the same. He rang his mother to tell her 
he was okay, but also to tell his wife and son that he 
loved them since he was about to risk his life in 
performing his job – „I gotta do what I gotta do‟ (in 
DiMarco, 2007: 101). Gabriel saw his colleagues 
running into one of the Towers as it collapsed to the 
ground. Ralph Blasi, a security manager working in a 
building across the street, had often asked his guards 
what they would do if there was a disaster and dead 
bodies littered the streets. „The consensus was always 
that they would run‟ (Blaisi in Fink & Mathias, 2002: 
57). But on 9/11, guards did not run. Blaisi had 60 
guards working for him that day. Not one ran. On the 
contrary, they guided 45 thousand people out of 
Manhattan, saving countless lives. Then, there is the 
story of Rick Rescorla – a security manager working in 
one of the Towers. He ignored security advice that his 
building was not at risk and evacuated, saving the lives 
of almost 3000 workers. Unfortunately, Rescorla died 
in the Towers‟ collapse. He kept running back into the 
Towers to save as many people as possible (Wisloski, 
2011, and see rickrescorla.com).  
Security guards play a vital role in the tourism 
industry. They are ubiquitous features of travel – in 
airports, hotels, resorts, events, and monuments – and 
important contributors to travellers‟ perceptions of 
safety and security. With the significant threat that 
terrorism poses to the tourism industry, security guards 
are asked to play important roles in tourism counter-
terrorism functionality. 
Imagining Security Guards in Popular 
Culture  
As Momus (in Žižek, 2014: 141-142) argues, „Certain 
scenarios in the real world can be as absurd as jokes, 
self-evidently laughable, no matter how tragic they 
are‟. He argues that „Comedy is a legitimacy crisis 
followed by the sudden appearance of a cornucopia‟.  
Security guards occupy an ambivalent place in 
contemporary society. We often imagine security 
guards as figures of failure, the subjects of jokes and 
humiliation. When they are not viewed as satirical 
under-achievers, they are often viewed as dangerous 
and potentially violent members of the social fringe, 
criminalistic and uncertain. Indeed, security guards are 
pilloried in many different forms of popular culture. 
The Southern Californian, pro-marijuana legalization 
music group, Kottonmouth Kings, included a song on 
their 2004 album condemning security guards for their 
violent tactics for crowd control especially against 
younger people, their aggression, and their paradoxical 
desire for power but low social standing: 
All these security guards, running around 
shows always acting hard. 
Why can‟t we get along, party all night until the 
break of dawn.  
Why don‟t you leave us alone? … 
Acting like you‟re a cop but you ain‟t got no 
badge. 
Trying to take my pot then you‟re getting a toe 
tag. 
Searching people‟s pockets, acting like a true 
jake. 
I can see you buying steroids with your 
minimum wage („Leave us alone‟, 
Kottonmouth Kings, 2004). 
Media reports on security guards often highlight 
criminality, delinquent behavior, and violence. In 
scholarly circles, studies of security guards are often 
housed in criminological discourses where the 
emphasis is on security guard‟s role as an appendage to 
legitimate policing forces and organizations or as 
private police – a literal replacement for the inability of 
police forces to deliver reliable public safety. In 
Australia, this was a significant concern during the 
Commonwealth Games in Melbourne in 2006 where 
security workers and guards significantly outnumbered 
police force members (Ker & Murphy, 2006). In the 
lead-up to the Games, there was considerable public 
debate about the role of security guards in public 
safety. After revelations that the original tender for 
Commonwealth Games security had failed to elicit a 
large enough pool of applicants in a timely fashion 
leading to a re-issue of the tender months before the 
Games began, security analyst Myles Newlove (2005) 
argued that  
You‟re going to have security guards being 
used in the Commonwealth Games that are ill-
equipped and not trained to a level that is 
required for searching of vehicles for explosive 
devices.  
This debate was framed in discourses of security guard 
criminality. An Australian sporting personality had 
been killed the previous year by an over-zealous 
security guard at a Melbourne hotel. Criminality and 
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incompetence were almost assumed, and many believe 
that the Melbourne Commonwealth Games were 
vulnerable to a terrorist attack. 
A November 2010 report by the labour union 
representing security guards in Australia, the Liquor, 
Hospitality and Miscellaneous Workers Union 
(LHMU) (renamed United Voice in 2011) tells a 
similar story. They suggest that the demand for 
security guards spurred by the threat of terrorism to 
Western cities has led to the market becoming flooded 
with „rogue‟ providers that have set off „a ferocious 
price war‟ that has seen quality of security guards drop 
significantly. Profits in the security guard industry have 
subsequently been made by „cutting corners‟ through 
understaffing, enforcing excessive working hours, lax 
regulation of health and safety, and by hiring 
dangerously unqualified, untrained guards (LHMU, 
2010: 6; Howie, 2012: 142). In the report there are 
many examples of media stories depicting weak and 
ineffective security. The following is a selection of 
headings from articles recently published in Australian 
newspapers: 
Concerns organised crime infiltrating private 
security firms 
Security guards reprimanded for undue force 
Security chief faces drugs, firearm charges 
Security laws bent to allow brazen rorting  
Private police out of control 
Guilty plea on unlicensed security 
Elderly man thrown out of Sunshine hospital 
after complaining about wait 
Security firm flouting laws 
Student sues for „slavery‟: $200 for 158 hours 
work 
Security operator stole $390,000 (LHMU, 
2010: 5, 18, 21-26, 31, 42).   
Popular culture seemingly views security guards as a 
fringe, unruly and dangerous species. Quick to anger, 
poor and unsophisticated, useless and ultimately 
expendable. In films they are often killed with little 
concern or consequence. In The Matrix (1999) security 
guards are slaughtered en masse whilst doing nothing 
more than performing their jobs. The metaphor of „the 
agents‟ becomes one of expendability. As Morpheus 
explains to Neo, „The Matrix is a system, Neo. That 
system is our enemy . . . these people are still part of 
that system and that makes them our enemy„. In 
American Psycho (2000) security guards in large 
buildings in New York City were easy targets of 
antihero Patrick Bateman‟s frustrations. He 
unnecessarily kills a guard in a building he mistakenly 
enters. This is a metaphor for sameness and a social 
commentary on the horror of an indistinguishable 
identity and insignificance, something apparently 
exemplified by security guards – every building has 
them, and they pass by mostly unnoticed.  
Paul Blart: Mall Cop (2009) tells the story of security 
guard Paul Blart (played by Kevin James), who works 
in a large shopping complex in New Jersey. I argue 
that the portrayal of security guards in this movie 
typifies the place of security guards in the social 
imagination. Paul Blart is white, overweight, and 
unmanly. His comedic buffoonery, incompetence, and 
failure to be a real cop is the context for his 
transformation from loser to unlikely hero. In a telling 
scene, Paul Blart is showing a new guard the 
procedures for protecting the mall: 
Blart: Hey. Paul Blart. Ten-year veteran. 
Sims: Wow. Veck Sims. 
Blart: Well, Veck Sims, welcome to the show. 
Let‟s mount up … So what made you want to 
pursue security? 
Sims: I never finished high school. This is all I 
could get (Carr, 2009; Drew‟s Script-O-Rama, 
no date). 
The suggestion that being a security guard is evidence 
of failure, of being a drop-out, is quickly negated as it 
becomes apparent that Sims is that other form of 
security guard in the social imagination; the criminal. 
Betraying his colleagues, Sims violently takes control 
of the mall and holds several employees as hostages. 
He assembles a group of social misfits at the same 
social level as the security guard – a skater punk, a 
BMX rider, and tattooed and pierced young people. 
Paul Blart is the only man willing to stand up to these 
social misfits and resist, despite being hopelessly 
untrained and incompetent. As his manager reminds 
him,  
Listen, I think you‟re making a big mistake. 
SWAT‟s on the way. And I‟m not gonna 
sugarcoat it, you‟re untrained, you‟re unarmed. 
And let‟s face it, son, you present a huge target 
(Carr, 2009; Drew‟s Script-O-Rama, no date). 
His personal transformation is mirrored by a pop-
cultural reflection on the roles of security guards and a 
realization that it is an „undervalued job‟ but „an 
honorable task‟ (Plotz, 2013: 173). The metaphor is 
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then tripled as his awakening is depicted via his 
pathway from femininity to white masculinity. The 
film‟s message is that there are, apparently, no small 
roles in this life – only small white men. Paul Blart is 
able to reclaim his masculinity and redeem his life 
from the supposed obvious inferiority of his profession. 
The film reminds viewers that security guards may be 
expected to be heroes when circumstances call for it. 
Indeed, Paul Blart realizes his value, his role, and is 
able to save the day in true Hollywood fashion by 
faking incompetence. In this crucial scene Paul Blart 
pretends during a fist fight to succumb to his Achilles 
heel – he pretends to faint due to hypoglycemia. In the 
moment when the bad guy relaxes believing Blart is 
defeated, he administers a vicious sweep kick that 
takes the villain down.  
Žižek (2014: 88-89) has made a similar argument in 
relation to George W. Bush‟s presidency and Dan 
Quayle‟s Vice-Presidency. He argues that Bush‟s 
„slips‟ – those many moments when he would say 
something odd, wrong or ill-considered – may actually 
be psychoanalytic „supreme slips‟, thereby providing 
more truth than any ordinary, “correct”, language could 
ever hope to. The secret psychoanalytic twist is that 
incompetence is the ideal place for genius to hide. You 
can achieve a lot when people expect little from you. 
As Žižek (2014: 89) explains, these slips: 
. . . get a little bit more interesting when pure 
tautology is emphatically offered as a causal 
explanation; see the following slip of Quayle: 
“When I have been asked who caused the riots 
and the killing in Los Angeles, my answer has 
been direct and simple: Who is to blame for the 
riots? The rioters are to blame. Who is to blame 
for the killing? The killers are to blame.  
Žižek (2014: 89) notes that whilst this explanation was 
unacceptable to many and was ridiculed in some 
circles, there is a strong tenant of conservative, neo-
liberal ideology that supports it – systemic forces are 
not to blame for violence. Individuals are. They should 
be responsible for their actions! Bush Junior, for his 
part, gave the world this oddity – „I believe we are on 
an irreversible trend towards more freedom and 
democracy – but that could change‟ (in Žižek, 2014: 
90). Bush‟s slip contains a flawless ideological logic. 
Freedom and democracy is irreversible, until it isn‟t. A 
similar twist can be found in a Futurama (1999-2013)
episode where the robot, Bender, meets God in space. 
Bender asks, „So do you know I‟m going to do 
something before I do it?‟ God responds, „Yes‟. 
Bender, unsatisfied, quizzes, „What if I do something 
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else?‟ God plainly replies, „Then I don‟t know 
that‟ (Dietter, 2002). An action is only real once it has 
happened. Before it has happened it is in a state of 
quantum uncertainty. God only knows what we will do, 
not what we don‟t do. 
It is in this context that we should understand the final 
ironic twist in Paul Blart: Mall Cop (2009). Blart is 
assisted by his security manager to neutralize the final 
bad guy – a member of the police SWAT team – who 
is also a bully from Blart‟s high school – yet another 
metaphor portraying security guards as social losers 
and non-security others as successful „winners‟. As 
viewers we are led to believe that a police officer has 
shot this mastermind of the mall siege, but as the 
camera pans back we learn that a security guard has 
taken the policeman‟s gun from his holster and 
delivered the triumphant bullet. The films‟ message is 
clear – police officers will often be looked on to 
provide public safety as first responders, but security 
guards are already there, already keeping you safe. 
They are the first first responders. 
Conclusion: Who is Responsible for our 
Safety? 
Korstanje and Clayton (2012: 11) argue that tourism 
managers and terrorist organizations share something 
in common; „Both tourism and terrorism rely on media 
management; the creation and manipulations of beliefs 
and perceptions‟. Similarly, security often has more to 
do with providing the appearance and feeling of safety 
than providing actual, physical security. Indeed, 
security guards are mostly employed to deter 
vandalism, prevent minor violence and damage. In 
short, to keep the peace, broadly defined. They cannot 
use violence, are often unarmed, and have little hope of 
stopping a determined criminal or terrorist. This is 
especially the case for suicide bombers. Denying a 
suicide bomber entry to a building or secured site will 
likely result in their device being detonated amidst 
security guards or some other crowded, public area. 
We ask security guards to preserve the safety of others 
and it has sometimes cost them their lives.  
The words security guard carry particular, often 
negative, connotations. It implies refusal of entry, 
illegitimate control of public space, and the unlawful 
use of force. However, we hope that when disaster 
strikes, security guards will help, perhaps even come to 
our rescue as they did on 9/11. If their actions on that 
day are any indication, then security guards will be 
heroes when the unthinkable happens – a major 
terrorist strike in a large city. This may even involve 
guiding the wealthiest and most affluent members of 
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the business world to safety and working hand-in-hand 
with policing and emergency services in saving 
thousands of lives. We hope they will do this despite 
the fact that they are low-paid and enjoy low social 
status. That is, perhaps, a big ask. 
Leaders and managers working in the tourism industry 
should consider the consequences of having low-paid, 
highly stressed, under-valued security guards in their 
employ (United Voice, 2011: 32). There are two sides 
to this coin  
1) Will cheap security provide effective protection? 
and  
2) Is it morally acceptable to ask low-paid workers to 
risk their lives when their job calls for it? 
There are many precedents in industry where security 
guards are sometimes highly trained and well paid – at 
defence sites; at government and other important 
buildings and locations; at some sporting events; 
cultural and religious events; at nuclear, power and 
water facilities; and in war-zones. It could be argued 
that there are many circumstances where highly 
effective security guards are essential. Why are sites of 
tourism not among them? It is a challenging question 
for which there may often be very good answers – 
perhaps your corner of the tourism industry is low-
profile; in a non-volatile location; does not regularly 
see mass gatherings of people; or a host of other 
reasons. Whilst a security over-reaction would provide 
terrorism with an unnecessary role in what would be an 
over-anxious life, we should also remember that 
preventing terrorism is never just the responsibility of 
government and policing agencies. And we should all 
be mindful of the well-being of those who are 
responsible for our safety, especially when they are 
security guards employed in private companies.    
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